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SOVEREIGNTY, JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AND 
PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIB_UNALS 
Kenneth S. Gallant* 
INTRODUCTION 
Systematic murder, torture, rape and genocide in places such as Rwanda, 
Bosnia, Cambodia and Somalia has focussed attentio~ on the need to hold individuals 
responsible for gross violations of international humanitarian law. As a result, the 
United Nations, through the Security Council, has established two ad hoc interna-
tional tribunals, to prosecute alleged violators of international humanitarian law in 
the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. Interest has also grown in the proposal before 
the International Law Commission to establish a permanent international criminal 
tribunal, whose jurisdiction might or might not be limited to serious violations of 
international humanitarian law and the laws of war. 
International law has traditionally defined the rights and responsibilities of 
states with regard to each other. During the past century, the developineni of 
international humanitarian and human rights law has focussed attention on the 
protection of individuals. 'fhis has recently led to the development of regional 
adjudicatory bodies for human rights law ·such as the European Court of Human 
Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. States have given to these 
supra-national bodies the authority to pass binding judgments against them in order 
to enforce regional human rights covenants. 
Concomitantly, an u~derstanding has grown that it is persons who cause the 
abstract entities called states to take actions. The indirection of saying that 'states' 
may not commit mass rape in pursuit of war aims, for example, has not prevented 
certain men of Serb ethnicity from raping hundreds of women because they were 
Muslim. This is not to say that holding states responsible for human rights violations 
has been thoroughly ineffective. This method does, however, needs supplementa-
tion. 
Modern cases of genocide and other systematic crimes against humanity occur 
when the individual perpetrators are acting on behalf of state policy, as in the case 
of Nazi Germany, or when a state of rebellion has prevented the central government 
from protecting human rights, as in the case of atrocities in the rebel held areas of 
• Fulbcight Lecturer, National Law School of India University, and Professor and Director of 
Clinical Programs, University of Idaho School of Law, Moscow, Idaho, USA. This paper is based 
upon a presentation to the NLSIU Continuing Legal Education Workshop on Human Rights Law 
and Practice, Bangalore, India on 18 October 1995. The material has been updated with a few 
references to the Dayton Peace Accords, initialed in November 1995 and signed in December 1995, 
which as of the current writing hold out promise for ending the war in the former Yugoslavia, 
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Bosnia, or where order has so broken down that it is difficult to determine whether 
an effective government exists, as in the case of Rwanda. Merely holding a state 
responsible after the fact of these atrocities cannot effectively deter persons from 
committing human rights violations in the future. 
In each of these types of cases, the state (or would-be state such as the Bosnian 
Serb entity1) is unwilling or unable to prosecute the perpetrators of atrocities. Other 
nations will have difficulty prosecuting the perpetrators under theories of universal 
jurisdiction. In most cases they will not have access to most of the potential 
defendants and they may be perceived as having a political agenda for such 
prosecution. Thus the idea of establishing an international tribunal has become very 
attractive as a means of imposing individual responsibility for these types of crime. 
JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE, SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL 
CRliHINAL COURTS 
The unwillingness or inability of states to punish violations of international 
humanitarian law is the chief motivation for establishing an international criminal 
. court.2 To be effective in these cases, and to deter future crimes, an international 
criminal court must have the legal authority to obtain the presence of defendants and 
to gather evidence, even in the face of government inaction or opposition. Legal 
authority must be backed up by an enforcement mechanism to ensure cooperation of 
states and execution of court warrants and orders.3 
The Ad Hoc Criminal Tribunals 
The current ad hoc International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia 
(IC1FY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have been 
established by the United Nations Security Council as enforcement measures to 
reestablish and maintain international peace under Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter.4 A state which fails or refuses to obey an order of one of the Tribunals to 
The Republika Srpska, which under the November 1995 Dayton Peace Accords, •signed in Paris 
in December 1995 is a constituent 'Entity' of the State called 'Bosnia and Herzegovina'. Consti-
tution of Bosnia and Herugovina, Art. 3 (unofficial text). 
2 · Some would add the inability or unwillingness of states to prosecute international drug trafficking 
and other major international economic crimes as well. 
3 In this pap.:r 'authority' will be used for legal authority as stated in op.:rative legal documents such 
as Security Council Resolutions, statutes and treaties. 'Power' will ref er to the physical, political 
and moral force necessary to ensure compliance with court orders or warrants. 'Enforcement 
mechanism' will apply to the legal, political and other structures which can provide the power to 
enforce compliance. 
4 U.N. Security Council Resolution 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (1993), reprinted in 321.L.M. 1203 
(hereinafter S.C. Res. 827); U.N. Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993) 
(hereinafter S.C. Res. 808); Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security 
Council Resolutfon 808, U .N. Doc. S/25704 & Add. 1 (1993), reprinted · in 32 I.L.M. 1163 
(hereinafter Secretary-General's Report). S.C. Res. 827 enacted the Statute of the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former YugoslaYia (hereinafter ICTFY Statute), which repeats the basis 
of the creation of the Tribunal. · 
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transfer or surrender a suspect commits an international wrong and is subject to 
referral to the Security Council for appropriate action.5 Whether or not the Security 
Council will actually use its power and epforce the arrest warrants and requests for 
surrender of the ICTFY remains to be seen.6 
The ability to enforce orders is a necessity to the functioning of an international 
. criminal court in a situation in which one or more States has an interest in protecting 
persons from prosecution. Nonetheless, this authority derogates from the traditional 
sovereign rights of states.7 Under the ICTFY Statute, for example, states do not retain 
their traditional freedom, in the absence of an extradition or other treaty, to determine 
whether and when to surrender persons to another state. 
This is an important development in international law.Unlike the previous War 
Crimes Tribunals, at Nuremberg and Tokyo following World War II, the TCTFY and 
!CTR do not claim jurisdiction over individuals on the basis of their status as 
prisoners of war of a victorious sovereignty. Instead, they claim jurisdiction as 
supranational entities, subsidiary organs of the United Nations, with authority over 
states. 
In fact, the authority of the Tribunals may be greater than even that of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ). First, the Tribunals have primacy of jurisdiction 
over national courts. A State cannot exempt itself, its nationals, or others within its 
territory from the Tribunal's authority. By contrast, the jurisdiction of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice is limited to cases brought before it by agreement of states, 
and cases brought by and against States who have consented to the mandatory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ.8 . 
The International Tribunal for Rwanda was established on a similar basis. U.N. Security Council 
Resolution 955. S/RES/955 (1994) (hereinafter S .C. Res. 955), which enacted the Statute of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (hereinafter !CTR Statute). 
5 The author has discuss<.!d this issu.:: at som.:: length in K.S. Gallant, Securing the Presence of 
Defendants before the lntemation.al Tribimal for the Fonner Yugoslavia: Breaking with Extradi-
tion, 5 Crim. L. Forum 557 (1994). 
6 The plans of the various entities involved to cooperate with the ICTFY as of the beginning of 1995 
is set out in D. Cotic, /11trocluctio11 (to A Critical Study ofrhe lntemational Trib1malfor the Fonner 
Yugoslavia), 5 Crim. L. Forum 223 at 234-35 & nn. 26-29 (1994) (citing sources). The situation · 
is fluid following the initialing of the Dayton peace agreements in November 1995, and their 
signing in December. 
7 See, R. A. Kolodk.in, An Ad Floe /nremation.al Tribunal for the Prosecution of Serious Violations 
of International Humanitarian Law in the Fonner Yugoslavia, 5 Crim. L. Forum 381 at 385-86 
and n. 11, citing Note Verbale from the Permanent Representative of Mexico to the Secretary-
General, March 12, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/25417, and Letter from the Perman.::nt Representative of 
France to the Secretary-General, February 10, 1993, U.N. Doc. S/25266. Prof.::ssor Rubin presents 
the view that the ICTFY Statute wrongly derogates from the sov.!reign equality of states. A. P. 
Rubin, An lntemational Criminal Tribunal/or Foriner Y11goslm·ia .? 6 Pace lnt'l L. Rev. 7 (1994). 
8 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 36 (hereinafter ICJ Statute). 
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Second, under the United Nations Charter, "If any party to a case (before the 
ICJ) fails to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered 
by the Court, the other party may have recourse to the Security Council, which may, 
if it deems necessary, make recommendations or decide upon measures to be taken 
to give effect to the judgment."9 By contrast, the Report of the Secretary-General 
proposing the Statute of the ICTFY states that an Order of the Tribunal "for the 
surrender and transfer of persons to the custody of the International Tribunal shall 
be considered to be the application of an enforcement measures under Chapter VII 
of the Charter of the United Nations."10 This indicates that the orders of the Tribunal 
for surrender and transfer (and, by implication, arrest warrants) have at least the same 
force as final judgments of the ICJ. 
Additionally, the Statute of the ICJ states that judgments of the Court are not 
binding except between the States concerned on the matter in controversy .11 The 
Statutes of the two Security Council tribunals are silent_ on the stare decisis effect 
of their judgments. The fact that the Appellate Chamber of the two Tribunals is to 
be made up of the same judges suggests that there is a hope that they will develop 
a consistent body of international criminal law. If the tribunals begin deciding cases 
on the authority of their prior cases, they will be taking a further step towards the 
expansion of international judicial powers. 12 
The derogation from sovereignty implied by the Statutes of the Security 
Council tribunals is justified by the accession of United Nations members to the 
United Nations Charter. They can be held to have submitted to the authority of the 
Security Council to enact binding resolutions to "maintain or restore international 
peace and security following the requisite determination or the existence ofa threat 
to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression."13 
9 U.N. Charter, Art 94(2). 
10 Secretary-General's Report. para. 126; see International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in I.he Territory 
of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc . IT/32/Rev. 3 
(1995) Rule 59 (hereinafter ICTFY); see generally discussion in Gallant, supra note 5 at 565. 
11 See ICJ Statute, Arts . 59, 61. 
12 Compare ICJ Statute, Art. 38(d) (making I.he "judicial decisions ... subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law,.). Note there are the possibilities that the tribunals will assert that 
their decisions are precedential o~ly as to procedure and possibly evidence, but not as to the 
substance of international criminal law; or that the tribunals will use their prior decisions 
concerning the definition of crimes within• their jurisdiction aud defenses. The latter claim can be 
• seen as indirectly asserting a lawmaking authority. 
13 Secretary-General's Report, para. 22. The Rules of I.he ICTFY, adopted by the Judges of the 
Tribunal , go further, defining a state as .. A State Memlx:r or non-Memlx:r of the United Nations 
or a self-proclaimed entity de facto exercising governmental functions, whether recognized as a 
State or not; ...... ICTFY Rule 2. In the case of I.he ICTFY, this definition of state might conceivably 
be justified on a theory fhat all states or would-be states now in the territory of the old Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia have succeeded to its duty to comply with the United Nations Charter. As 
a general proposition, however, I.his theory is insufficient to apply to states I.hat are not and never 
were U.N. members, although I.he ICTFY Rule purports to include such application. 
24 National Law School Journal · [1997 
The Proposed Permanent International Criminal Court 
The issue of derogation from sovereignty cannot be escaped so easily for a 
· proposed permanent international criminal court. The inability or unwillingness of 
States to prosecute severe violations of international humanitarian law is the chief 
reason for seeking establishment of such a court. This means a permanent court, to 
be effective, will require powers similar to those of the ICTFY and ICTR that may 
place permanent limits on the traditional sovereign prerogatives of States. 
A permanent international criminal court will need an enforceable regime of 
judicial assistance that will ope~ate from the beginning of a criminal investigation 
through trial. In general, the dependence of the international criminal court on 
assistance will be greater than that of national courts. 
In the typical case before an international criminal court, the international 
prosecutor will need to investigate and gather evidence concerning an alleged crime 
from the beginning. The prosecutor's office will typically not be located in the 
national jurisdiction .in which any of the victims, witnesses, evidence or defendants 
will be found. Thus, the prosecutor will need to engage in a wide-ranging investi-
gation which will require operation in or assistance from all jurisdictions in which 
any of these may be found. Additionally, defense counsel will similarly need 
assistance in investigation and to compel the appearance of witnesses and evidence 
at trial. Thus, the assistance that the international criminal court will need will 
included searches for and seizures of evidence, enforcement of the right of 
prosecutorial officials and investigators to travel, observe the scenes of alleged 
crimes and interview witnesses, enforcement of the compulsory attendance of 
witnesses and production of evidence at the international criminal tribunal, and 
enforcement of orders to arrest and produce defendants before the international 
criminal tribunal. 
There is one new theory on which consent can be based: the new Constitution of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, adopted as part of the Dayton Accords initiated in November 1995 and signed in 
December, states: 
... Bosniacs, Croats, and Serbs, as constituent peoples (along with others), and citizens of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina hereby determine that the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
is as follows: 
Article I -Bosnia and Herzegovina -1. Continuation. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
the official name of which shall henceforth be "Bosnia and Herzegovina," shall continue its 
legal existence under international law as a state, with its internal structure modified as 
provided herein and with its present internationally recognized borders. It shall remain a 
Member State of the United Nations and may as Bosnia and Herzegovina maintain or apply 
for membership in organizations within the United Nations system and other international 
organizations. 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Preamble and Art. I. Sec. l (unofficial text). If this 
Consti_tution does in fact end the dispute over the status of quasi-states such as the Bosnian Serb 
entity, then the renewed submission of the entire nation-state of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the 
Charter of the United Nations might be held to render moot any claim that the ICTFY' s jurisdiction 
does not extend to any place within, or citizen of, Bosnia and Herzegovina. See also Cotic, 
"Introduction," supra n. 6 on the position of entities regarding cooperation with the ICTFY • 
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By contrast, a national prosecutor seeking international judicial assistance 
generally is operating on a complaint from a victim or on other evidence found 
within his or her national jurisdiction. Judicial assistance required is usually limited 
to producing named defendants or witnesses or specifically identified evidence to 
the courts_ in which the prosecution is occurring. 
The breadth of necessary investigations in cases before a permanent interna-
tional criminal court defines the necessary parameters for mandatory international 
judicial assistance. As mentioned, the prosecutor must have the compulsory ability 
to investigate alleged crimes and to search for victims, witnesses and other evidence. 
The prosecutor must be able to compel the appearance in the international tribunal 
of defendants, witnesses, and evidence. Defense counsel must similarly be able to 
investigate the case and compel the appearance of witnesses and evidence. 
These needs define a limited, but significant, imposition upon national sover-
eignty. Such a permanent imposition will be most legitimate, and most likely to be 
enforceable, if consented to by states. This suggests that a permanent international 
criminal court should be set up by multilateral treaty .14 This would ensure that all 
state parties to the treaty have consented to the restrictions on sovereignty. In order 
to be effective, however, it requires near-universal accession to the treaty. One 
difficulty is that states most likely to enact policies requiring or allowing their 
officials to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law are those 
least likely to accede to such a treaty. Another difficulty is the possibility of new 
states or would-be states carved out of the territory of existing states asserting that 
they are not within the jurisdiction of the court because they have not assented to 
the treaty establishing the -court. 
Additionally, a permanent court will need an enforcement mechanism to play 
the role that Security Council plays with regard to IC1FY and ICTR. Such a structure 
will not be easy to establish as part of a treaty.15 The weakness, described above, 
of the well-established ICJ suggests the difficulty of giving mandatory powers to a 
new tribunal. 
Many decolonized nations are reluctant to enter agreements that limit national 
sovereignty. Some wonder whether it is consistent to insist on national sovereignty 
14 Kolodkin, supra n. 5 at 385, describes this as the 'orthodox' method, after the terminology of A. 
Pellet, Le Tribunal criminal international pour l'ex Yougoslavie: poudre aux yeux ou avancee 
decisive?, 98 Re..,-ue Generale de Droit Internationale Public 7 at 25 (1994). 
15 The International Law Commission 1993 and 1994 draft statutes suggest that the Security Council 
might refer cases to the proposed permanent international criminal court, but other aspects of the 
relationship between the Court and the Security Council are unclear, including whether the Security 
Council would have the power to take enforcement action where a state refused to surrender or 
arrest a defendant, even in cases in which the original reference had come from the Council. See 
Report of the International Law Commission on its Forty-sixth Session, U.N. G.A.O.R., 49th Sess., 
Supp. No. 10, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994) (hereinafter ILC 1994 Draft); Report of the Working 
Group on a Draft Statuteforan International Criminal Court, in Report of the International Law 
Commission on its Forty-fifth Session, U.N. G.A.O.R., 48th Sess. , Supp. No. 10, at 245, U .N. Doc. 
A/48/ 10 (1993) (hereinafter ILC 1993 Draft). 
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in one area of international relations, but abandon it in other areas. 16 However, 
almost all international agreements imply some limitation on the sovereignty of the 
states making the agreement, in return for benefits that the states hope will flow 
from the agreement. Once this principle is admitted, there is no inconsistency in 
determining that for the common good some particular attribute of sovereignty will 
be surrendered, while insisting on the retention of others.17 One of the most 
important questions for diplomats and politicians of all nations in the twenty-first 
century will be: in what areas of law, and to what extent, should national sovereignty 
be subordinated to international (regional or global) organizations and arrange-
ments? 
Another possibility is that a permanent international criminal court could be 
established as part of the much-discussed future restructuring of the United Nations 
system, including a potential expansion of the Security Council's membership and 
functions. 18 Part of the expansion of function could include an enforcement power 
for orders of an international criminal tribunal. This would require an amendment 
of the United Nations Charter, which can be achieved only by a two-thirds approval 
by United Nations member states, including all permanent members of the Security 
Council. 19 
The treaty method assures that every affected state consents to limitations on 
sovereignty .20 The Charter amend.ment process does not, but only provides for a 
supermajority of state ratifications. The Charter amendment process, however, 
16 This issue was raised in discussions at the Workshop on Human Rights Law and Practice by an 
advocate of Indian economic self-sufficiency who questioned the wisdom of India's acceptance of 
limitations on its sovereignty contained in the World Trade Organisation agreements, and who 
wondered if he could consistently agree to limitations on sovereignty designed to protect human 
rights. 
17 The current debates about sovereignty are in some ways richly ironic. The nations of Europe, who 
developed current notions of sovereignty and the nation-state at roughly the same time they were 
expanding their empires, are currently the ones who are most in favour of limitations on 
sovereignty and of the universalization of human rights. The lesser-developed nations, such as the 
Group of 77, are the ones most in favour of preser,ing the sovereign prerogatives of nations. Yet 
it is these countries which have been worst affected by the unbridled exercise of sovereignty by 
the former imperial powers; and they are least equipped to face the unrestricted might of the current 
great powers on even terms. 
Interestingly, the United States, of which the author is a citiien, is in an uneasy position between 
that of Europe and the Group of 77. Sovereigntists such as former United Nations Ambassador 
Jeane Kirkpatrick vie for intellectual and political supremacy with internationalists such as former 
President Jimmy Carter. The author agrees more with the former President. 
18 As of this writing, a number of states, including Germany, Japan, India and others, are seeking to 
become permanent members of the Security Council in such a restructuring. 
19 U.N. Charter, Arts. 108, 109. More than an affirmative vote by General Assembly members is 
needed. A.two-thirds majority (including all permanent Security Council members) must ratify the 
change to the Charter under their own constitutional procedures. 
20 Even the treaty method does not completely address the issue of successor states or would-be 
states. 
Vol. 9] Sovereignty, Judicial Assistance & Protection of Human Rights 27 
provides an easier mechanism for providing for enforcement of a new permanent 
court's orders. 
One possibility for addressing both the need of an international criminal court 
for enforcement powers and the issue of voluntariness of surrender of sovereign 
powers would be to link the creation of a court by treaty to the amendment of the 
United Nations Charter. The treaty could provide for reference to the Security 
Council of the action of any State which fails or refuses to obey an order of the 
international criminal court. The amendment to the United Nations Charter could 
provide that the Security Council would have the authority to take enforcement 
action in the case of failure or refusal to obey an order of the court, whether or not 
other criteria for Security Council action - such as a current threat of breach of 
international peace - existed.21 
PROTECTING HUiHAN RIGHTS FROM VIOLATION BY A PERMANENT 
INTERNATIONAL CR/iWINAL COURT 
Any criminal process can be abused, whether deliberately or negligently. 
Within the national judicial systems of most democracies, constitutional protections, 
supplemented by statute·s and court rules, seek to ensure that the essential human 
rights of defendants and others are not violated in the course of law enforcement. 
While there is controversy over the use of extradition procedures on behalf of 
individual rights, in fact these procedures sometimes prevent human rights abuses in 
the requesting state.22 
In the case of an international criminal court, however, national protections 
must be overridden to prevent a hostile (or hostage) state from protecting its own 
wrongdoers. The prosecutor in an international criminal court will n·eed to be able 
to compel assfatance from all states in the investigation of international humanitarian 
crimes, and the production of witnesses, evidence, and defendants before the 
tribunal. Protection of human rights must therefore occur, if at all, in the interna-
tional tribunal itself. 
An international criminal tribunal is not a state. Therefore it cannot be bound 
by treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that define 
international obligation to respect individual rights. This means that the treaty, 
statute or other documents establishing an international criminal tribunal need to 
specify the minimum set of individual human rights that the tribunal will respect. 
21 · C.f. U .N. Charter Art. 94(2) (allowing state "rec·ourse to the Security Council" if an opposing state 
party in an ICJ case "fails"to perform the obligations incumbent upon it under a judgment rendered 
by the Court"). · 
· Such a change to'the United Nations Oiarter might be phrased in general language, so as to allow 
for the creation by' treaty and addition to the United Nations system of other international courts. 
22 See I Satyadeva Bedi, International Extradition Law and Practice 23-28 (1991). 
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What protections should be afforded invididuals in the constitutive documents 
of an international criminal court? The substantive rights most often invaded by local 
and national criminal authority worldwide are the rights to be free from arbitrary 
arrest and imprisonment and to be secure from arbitrary searches and seizures -
essentially the rights to freedom and privacy. These rights are protected in the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Everyone has a right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected 
to arbitrary arrest or detention. 
No one shall be subjected to arbitrary ... interference with his privacy, family, 
home or correspondence ... 23 
These rights can be protected by setting general standards for filing of charges, 
arrest, and searches and seizures. The statute of an international criminal court might 
require that there be evidence of a prinia facie case before charges are filed; or that 
there be reasonable cause or probable cause to believe that the defen~ant bas 
committed a crime within the court's jurisdiction before an arrest warrant is issued 
or a warrantless arrest made. Similarly, a court statute could require reasonable cause 
or probable cause to believe that evidence of a crime within the court's jurisdiction 
will exist at a specified place before a search and seizure or electronic surveillance 
could be conducted by the court's investigatory arm or by a State authority acting 
at its request or direction.24 
Without such protections, persons in all countries may become vulnerable to 
the abuses of overzealous, politicized, incompetent or corrupt international prosecu-
tors. The Prosecutor for IC1FY and ICTR embodies none of these flaws. Courts and 
criminal justice systems must, however, be constituted so that they can withstand the 
violence that persons involved in them may do. 
Much concern has been given to the right of persons not to be convicted in 
international criminal courts for acts which were not crimes at the time they were 
committed (the principle of nulla peona sine lege and the prohibition of ex post facto 
criminal laws).25 Most proposals for an international criminal court have responded 
to this concern by including lists of crimes within the court's jurisdiction. The 
ICTFY and ICTR Statutes are clear about the crimes that are within their jurisdiction, 
23 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Arts. 9(1), 17(1) (hereinafter ICCPR); see 
also, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, U.N.G.A. Res 217 (III) (1948), Arts. 9, 12 
(hereinafter UDHR). 
24 The formulation of 'reasonable cause' or '.probable cause' is based upon the common law tradition. 
It is not presented as the only possible language that can protect the rights to liberty and privacy. 
25 See ICCPR, Art. 15(1); UDHR, Art. 11(2). 
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and limit themselves to crimes that were prohibited by international law at the times 
they were allegedly committed.26 
These rights are part of the core of human rights that enjoy near-universal 
recognition, although they are not always honoured in practice. They are rights that 
are too important to be left to the implementing procedures of a court, and should 
therefore be included in the constituent documents of any future international 
criminal court. 
There is not time in this paper to examine all the rights which need to be 
protected in an international criminal court. There is, however, an important 
procedural right that may be under threat even in the IC1FY and !CTR, as well as 
in proposed permanent international criminal tribunals. That is the right to present 
a fair factual defense to _charges.27 The ICTFY and the !CTR provide for the right 
to counsel and the power to summon defence witnesses and to prepare an appropriate 
defence. However, to the author's knowledge, adequate resources have not been 
made available for factual investigation to challenge the evidence that the prosecu-
tion presents and to discover evidence favourable to the defendant. Unless this is 
done, there will always be an opportunity for wrongdoers to assert that they are 
unjustly punished, and a reasonable possibility that innocent persons will be con-
victed. In funding the current ad hoc tribunals, and in designing a funding scheme 
for future international criminal courts, appropriate attention must be paid to the 
provision of a fair opportunity for defence investigation and the preparation of a 
factual defence. 
CONCLUSION 
Concern fer state s·overeignty in international law is often seen as opposed to 
concern for indi victual human rights. Often, states are accused of asserting sover-
eignty as a screen fo cover up human rights violations. But it is not the case that these 
interests are always opposed. 
An international criminal court, to be effective, must have some powers that 
are inconsistent with the traditional right of sovereign states to refuse to hand over 
alleged wrongdoers in the absence of treaty. In order to protect individual human 
rights, however, states should insist upon guarantees of a fair criminal procedure and 
substantive criminal law before surrendering this attribute of sovereignty to a 
permanent international criminal court. 
26 See ICTFY Statute Arts. 2-5; Secretary-General's Report, paras. 33-49; ICTR Statute Arts. 2-4. 
27 . See ICCPR, Art. 14(3)(b) (those criminally charged shall have the right "(t)o have adequate time 
and facilities for the preparation of his defence"); c.f.-UDHR, Art. 11(1) (presumption of innocence 
until after trial at which defendant "has had all the guarantees necessary for his defence."). 
